Military Book Review – Die Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg (IFZ)

Ostkrieg

Die Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg (The Wehrmacht in the War in the East), is certainly one of the best and most important books on the German army in WW2 I have read during the last 10 years. Sadly it does not yet seem to have been translated into the English language. The review below is not by me, but as its excellently written I take the liberty to publish it here (original text found on http://www.perspectivia.net/content/publikationen/francia/francia-recensio/2011-2/ZG/hartmann_strohn) 

If you read German, this title is a must have!

“Hartmann’s findings are striking and shed a new light onto many areas of the debate concerning the Wehrmacht and its role in the war in the East. He shows that the degree to which units were involved in war crimes was dependent on the role they had to fulfil in the Wehrmacht and occupational structure and was also influenced by rather random factors such as the area of deployment and time. Hartmann does not negate the fact that the Wehrmacht as an organisation was guilty of war crimes in many areas, but he argues for a more balanced and differentiated approach with regard to single units and individual soldiers. With his book »Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg«, Christian Hartmann has presented an outstanding work of scholarship”

Review by Matthias Strohn

The history of the Second World War continues to occupy historians and the interested wider public alike. Historiography has provided us with insights into the war, societies and virtually all other areas that have a point of contact with this conflict. German historiography in particular has undergone a number of changes in the approach to and views on this greatest conflict of modern times. Roughly speaking, the first twenty years after the war were characterised by memoirs of former generals and the thesis that Hitler had abused the German people and the German armed forces. From the late 1960s onwards, a generation of younger historians questioned this approach. Not only had they not been directly involved in the Nazi regime, but the opening of archives and the return of captured documents to Germany enabled this generation to look into new aspects and to provide new insights into the period. In line with the 1960s social changes and the advent of Marxist views in western German historiography, it was now argued that German society was far more important and involved in the Nazi regime than claimed hitherto. The same development can be seen in the historiography of the German armed forces in that period. Today it is obvious that the pendulum swung from one extreme to the other: Initially, all responsibility for genocide, war crimes and the like were denied by the former generals and the wider public. It was deemed appropriate to blame Hitler himself, his clique of Nazi leaders and the Waffen SS for all the atrocities committed between 1933 and 1945. With the advent of the new generation and their different approach to history this changed: the Wehrmacht was now regarded as an instrument that spread terror, committed war crimes and was an active supporter of Nazi ideology.

A low point in this development was reached with the first Wehrmacht Exhibition that opened in 1995. The crude arguments and the simplistic views presented in this exhibition called for a more balanced and less biased view and also awoke a new and wide interest in the history of the Wehrmacht. As a consequence, the prestigious Institut für Zeitgeschichte launched a research project which looked at the Wehrmacht and the role of the armed forces during the war. The aim was not so much to provide narrowly defined studies on operational or traditional military history, but to explore the role of the organisation Wehrmacht for and in the Third Reich. Another aim was to explore the social history of the Wehrmacht. In total, the project produced five monographs by Johannes Hürter, Peter Lieb, Dieter Pohl, Andreas Toppe and Christian Hartmann. The emphasis of the publication was on the war against the Soviet Union. Moreover, the members of the working group produced over 50 articles, some of which were published in the work that is part of this review and which marked the end of the project.

Christian Hartmann’s monograph explores the realities of war in the first year of the German-Russo war, the division between front-line and hinterland and the involvement of the Wehrmacht in war crimes and atrocities. His aim is not to understand the Wehrmacht as an institution and its role per se, but to provide us with an understanding of the 10 million German soldiers who were deployed to the Eastern Front. He concentrates his work on three fields that he regards – correctly – as the core areas of the Wehrmacht in the Second World War. Thus, his study is occupied with the biggest service of the Wehrmacht, the army, and its struggle on the decisive front of the war, the Eastern Front. Hartmann restricts his study to the first year of the war in the East, in which, as he puts it, »everything was decided, not only the war against the USSR«. Moreover, he claims that an evaluation of this period offers the best insight into the aims and ideas of the soldiers involved in this struggle, since the Wehrmacht was convinced of its strength and full of self-confidence, so that the actions of individuals and bigger social groups were not driven by outer influences, but from within. Within these three parameters, Hartmann examines the actions and histories of five German divisions. Divisions have not played a prominent role in modern military history, but Hartmann is right in arguing that the division was vital in the military organisation and that an examination of the divisional level offers many new insights: the structure of a division and its strength (the divisions examined were between 9,000 and 18,000 soldiers strong) put it in a place between two fields that have attracted most attention in military history; tactical studies and the fate of the individual, low-ranking soldier on the hand, and high-ranking generals and their operational and strategic decisions on the other hand. By choosing divisions as his study’s units, Hartmann closes this gap, because divisions operated at the interface between tactics and the operational level of war. He chooses five divisions that provide a representative view of the entire German army in the East in 1941/42: One tank division, two infantry divisions, and one Sicherungsdivision that was deployed in the hinterland away from the front-line and fulfilled a double-role as both fighting and occupation unit. Last, but not least, Hartmann examines the role of oneKommandant/Kommandantur des rückwärtigen Heeresgebietes or Korück(Commander of the hinterland), an example of the occupation forces that were deployed closer to the front-line. Even though not a division in the traditional sense of the word, Hartmann argues that a Korück’s size and structure made it comparable to such a unit.

This is the foundation on which Hartmann bases his evaluation. In five main chapters he then analyses the formations and their experiences in the first year of the war. The first chapter deals with the structure of the divisions and their composition, showing the differences in the individual units. In the second chapter Hartmann turns to the soldiers of these units. He analyses the social structure of the units; the soldiers’ backgrounds and their decorations and casualties as indicators for their bravery and combat effectiveness. Chapter three is devoted to the experiences of the individual units from June 1941 to June 1942. Hartmann clearly shows the different experiences of the units and their approaches to challenges such as regular and partisan warfare. These factors are picked up and developed in depth in the last two chapters in which Hartmann analyses the differences between front and hinterland and examines the contribution of the different units to war crimes and atrocities. Units of all five divisions were involved in war crimes in the first year of the war in the East, but Hartmann’s research enables us to differentiate: Maltreatment of prisoner and mass executions did not occur constantly, but were restricted to certain times and influenced by outer parameters. The worst behaviour in the sample group was shown by troops deployed in the hinterland, and, perhaps more surprisingly, by the elite 4th Panzer Division. Hartmann explains this with the social structure of the divisions: The 4th Panzer Division was commanded by a general who initially showed strong sympathies for Nazism and the region from which the division recruited was characterised by a strong general support for the Nazi regime. Moreover, the division between front and hinterland was of great importance. This is perhaps less surprising, but Hartmann shows this in a new clarity. The units at the front concentrated on their military core business – fighting, killing and getting killed. Occupational policy was the business of the troops of the hinterland. Even though this division of labour was sometimes broken down by deploying rear-echelon troops to the front and increased partisan activity in the hinterland, this division remained intact throughout the period examined. It was the regime’s aim to concentrate the army in the front area and to relieve it of as many tasks in the hinterland as possible. In 1943, 2.65 million German soldiers were deployed within seventy kilometres from the front-line while only approximately 200.000 were deployed further to the west as occupation forces. As a consequence, wide areas in the rear could no longer be controlled by the Wehrmacht.

Hartmann’s findings are striking and shed a new light onto many areas of the debate concerning the Wehrmacht and its role in the war in the East. He shows that the degree to which units were involved in war crimes was dependent on the role they had to fulfil in the Wehrmacht and occupational structure and was also influenced by rather random factors such as the area of deployment and time. Hartmann does not negate the fact that the Wehrmacht as an organisation was guilty of war crimes in many areas, but he argues for a more balanced and differentiated approach with regard to single units and individual soldiers. With his book »Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg«, Christian Hartmann has presented an outstanding work of scholarship. It is a prime example of German historical scholarship at its best. The structure of the book and the arguments are clear and compelling and they are supported by a vast amount of references. Also, the book is a »good read«, something that cannot be said of every academic book. Historians that have been educated in the English-speaking world might find the sheer amount of footnotes and the density of references a little daunting. It is up to the reader to decide if they want to see this as a weak point of the book. It should be clear that a scholarly work that can only be criticised for being academic is a great achievement. And Hartmann’s book is one of these works.

In contrast to Hartmann’s monograph, the last volume of the project published by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte contains a selection of articles by some of its members that also deal with the war on the Eastern front. In the introduction, the authors point out that an official view of the institute does not exist with regards to the war, German atrocities, etc. and this becomes obvious in the contributions of the authors, the approaches they have chosen and their conclusions. In total, the book contains ten articles by five authors. The first article by Christian Hartmann »Verbrecherischer Krieg. Verbrecherische Wehrmacht« picks up the themes discussed in his monograph reviewed above. Again, Hartmann points out the organisational structure of the German occupation of the Soviet Union which concentrated its forces near the front-line, and, as a consequence, resulted in the »dominance of military topics« for the Wehrmacht units, because they had to concentrate on their main task: fighting the Red Army. He then sums up the findings from his monograph with regards to prisoners of war, holocaust and partisans. The article provides a good – and much shorter – alternative to his monograph.

The second article by Dieter Pohl »Die deutsche Militärbesetzung und die Eskalation der Gewalt in der Sowjetunion« examines the role of the rear echelon troops and the occupation forces in the hinterland; that area that according to Hartmann was only insufficiently controlled by the Wehrmacht owing to both the weakness of the forces in that region and the fact that other organisations and party branches were often put in charge. Pohl concludes that the role of the Wehrmacht cannot always be analysed to the last degree, mainly because of problems with the availability of sources. Nevertheless, his findings put the Wehrmacht on the whole in a more negative light than Hartmann’s elaborations. Pohl argues that the military leadership accepted a »programme for murder«, which was implemented with the attack on the Soviet Union, but which saw a general radicalisation from September/October 1941 onwards, when it became clear that operation Barbarossa had failed. Another change is identified by Pohl for the months November/December 1941, when it was obvious that the war in the East would turn into a prolonged conflict, and that it would be important to utilise prisoners of war and the non-Russian population for the German war effort. However, the killings of Jews and other groups continued so that the spiral of escalation was not fully stopped. A further dimension of escalation was then introduced in 1942/43 with the increase in partisan activity and the German counter-measures that led to harsh reprisals and a massive loss of live. On the whole, Pohl argues that the increasing level of violence in the rear areas was not the sole responsibility of the Wehrmacht, but that a high level of anticommunism and racism in the armed forces contributed to this radicalisation.

In contrast to the two aforementioned articles which examine the Wehrmacht on the whole, Johannes Hürter chooses a case study. »Die Wehrmacht vor Leningrad« deals with the war-fighting and occupation policy of the German 18thArmy in the Leningrad region in the autumn and winter of 1941/42. Hürter shows that the decision to besiege Leningrad and to starve the population to death rather than to occupy the city came as a surprise to the troops who had prepared themselves for an attack on the city. Interestingly, this decision set in motion a radicalisation of the army’s occupation policy in its rear areas: if the death of a city had been decided by the higher leadership why should the soldiers worry about the fate of a few hundred thousand civilians in the hinterland? »Necessities of war« were now brought forward as the reason for a barbarisation of warfare, but Hürter shows that this term was used in a loose fashion and that the situation of the German troops in the Leningrad area was difficult, but not so desperate that the measures taken against the civilian population could be explained by military necessities. Hürter argues that, owing to the amorphous structure of the German state and also the German armed forces, the army level (between corps and army group) was the decisive level with regards to the barbarisation of warfare. At army level the directives from the higher leadership were turned into actions. In some areas, this worked in favour of the civilian population, because the armies tried to ease the fate of the population. Sadly, in the area of 18th Army under Generaloberst Küchler, it did not.

A second article by Dieter Pohl concentrates on the mass murder of one particular group, the Jews in the Ukraine between 1941 and 1943. His findings further differentiate our understanding of the »war of extermination« in the East. From July 1941 to July 1942, Pohl argues, different phases of an extermination policy in all stages of escalation occurred in this region. Pohl offers an interesting view on the German approach: In contrast to widespread belief, it was not the aim of the German occupation forces to exterminate the local population, but the killing of real or alleged enemies was seen as a tool for the destruction of the Soviet Union. It was this aim that was shared between the Nazi regime and wide parts of the Wehrmacht and which resulted in the comparatively small resistance from the Wehrmacht to this barbarisation. The prime target of this policy was the Jewish population that was widely seen as the main bearer of Bolshevism. Within the Wehrmacht Pohl makes out different opinions and views. The higher up the chain of command the issue of harsh measures was discussed, the more support could be found for it. He also sheds light on the co-operation between the military, the civilian authorities and the SS and police. While difficulties existed and the opinions of individuals sometimes differed from the official view, Pohl concludes that all organisations contributed willingly to the extermination of the Jews in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.

While the first half of the book is devoted to the bigger picture, the second half deals predominately with individual impressions and experiences from the war in the East. The first article is Johannes Hürter’s »Es herrschen Sitten und Gebräuche genauso wie im 30-jährigen Krieg«. Hürter has worked in depth on biographies of German generals and this article follows the approach taken in his monograph »Hitler’s Heerführer«. The article offers a view on the first year of the war through documents of General Gotthard Heinrici, first a commander of an army corps and then commander of an army in the middle sector of the Eastern front. Hürter introduces the person Heinrici, his background and his life up to 1941. He then presents a wide range of personal documents, from diary entries to letters to his wife and his family. The changes in the occupation policy are reflected in Heinrici’s observations, for instance the shock of the invasion’s failure in 1941 and the realisation that the Soviet population had to be utilised for the German war effort, an approach that he encouraged in his area of responsibility particularly in the years 1942 to 1943. Nevertheless, for him Russia remained a »foreign, and backward culture like one from the middle ages…«. He experienced the deterioration of warfare and the increasing number of atrocities which appalled him. He tried to stop the policy of scorched earth during the German retreats, but finally he had to realise that »the trade of soldiering is no longer satisfying«.

Peter Lieb’s article »Täter aus Überzeugung« also concentrates on an individual officer and his experiences. He examines the role of Oberst Carl von Andrian, commanding officer of Infantry Regiment 747, one of the regiments of 707thInfantry Division. This division is of special interest, since it was used by the organisers of the Wehrmacht exhibition to show the ongoing brutalisation of the war in the East. The division, mainly used for operations behind the front-line, has a particularly bad reputation, because it was involved in mass executions to a high degree. Lieb provides an overview of the complex role of his article’s antagonist. On the one hand, Andrian supported the harsh measures taken by the authorities and excused them as necessary steps in order to pacify the country. On the other hand, Lieb shows that Andrian suffered from this situation and that he often complained about the brutal behaviour of German troops. The article makes clear once again that the question of brutalisation of warfare in the East was multi-facetted and that this development cannot be explained one-dimensionally.

Christian Hartmann’s article »Massensterben oder Massenvernichtung« sheds light on the fate of Soviet prisoners of war. Similar to the articles by Lieb and Hürter, he uses autobiographical sources (in this case a personal diary) to explore the realities Soviet soldiers were facing in German prisoner of war camps. The author of the diary was a re-activated national-conservative Major named Gutschmidt, from 1940 to 1944 commanding officer of several prisoner of war camps, from 1941 onwards on the Eastern front. Hartmann first gives a short account of Gutschmidt and his life, before exploring the German prisoner of war camp system on the Eastern front of which Gutschmidt was an integral part. The article shows the flexibility that Gutschmidt, who was »free of hatred« towards the enemy, had in organising his camp, but also the limitations of that freedom imposed on him by his superiors and reality, for instance the vast number of Soviet prisoners that were captured by the Germans and the resulting food shortage. Moreover, bad and cold weather took its toll of the weakened Soviet prisoners. The combination of these factors resulted in horrendous losses even in camps with sympathetic personnel like Gutschmidt.

The last article in this group of personal accounts comes again from Johannes Hürter who examines the reports from Werner Otto von Hentig, the representative of the German foreign office at the 11th Army headquarters. Hentig reported his experiences of the fighting on the Crimea in 1941/42 back to his superiors in Berlin. This article nicely complements the other contributions, since it concentrates on a civilian representative and his views on the war in the East. Accordingly, the emphasis of Hentig’s report was less on pure military matters, but rather on questions of policy, the treatment of the civilian population and prisoners of war. He heavily criticised the German approach which did not only result in horrendous civilian casualties, but also in an alienation of the indigenous population. The reports can therefore be seen as a rather drastic example of criticism of the German approach to the war in the East. At the same time, they are also a document of the powerlessness of traditional diplomacy in this gigantic struggle. Throughout the war, the foreign ministry was not able to influence German policy in the occupied territories. It was decided either by military necessities or – to a higher degree – by Nazi ideology. Obviously, there was no room here for traditional diplomacy.

The final article in the book is a rather short contribution (8 pages) dealing with an alleged order from Stalin dated from 17 November 1941 which stated that Soviet troops had to attack villages in the German hinterland. Not only would this weaken the Germans, but it would also alienate the population, because the alleged order stated that the Soviet troops should wear German uniforms. In their contribution Christian Hartmann and Jürgen Zarusky show that the version of the order stating that German uniforms had to be worn by Soviet troops was not part of the original order and that the order had been re-produced incorrectly for political reasons.

Overall, the final major work of the project of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte on the Wehrmacht in the Second World War offers a wide range of different views on the German-Soviet War. All articles, although differing in their general message, are well researched and presented in a convincing scholarly manner. It is highly recommended not only to historians, but also to the general reader, because it provides a good overview of the Wehrmacht and answers questions regarding the occupation policy on the Eastern Front – in particular for the years 1941 and 1942.

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German veterans of Verdun (World War 1) – Video interviews

EK2In 1980, a German military historian conducted a series of interviews which were used in a documentary on the Battle of Verdun. The documentary itself is largely forgotten. There never was a VHS version and it has not been shown on TV for at least 20 years. I have been searching for ages to get a copy of it. Yesterday a friend of mine told me he had found a copy which he had recorded on VHS. 
Due to this I am now able to present these interviews (without the framework documentary they were embedded in) on my blog. As subtitling and translating is very time consuming I only did four interviews right now. Will add more at a later date.

Today all of these men and all other German veterans of World War 1 have joined the ranks of the Great Army. Material like this that should be preserved and shared. I hope you will enjoy these clips as much as I do. Feedback is welcome.

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…. They had conquered a notorious hill. They had lived in trenches that had been alternately French and German. These trenches sometimes lay filled with bodies in different stages of decomposition. They were once men in the prime of their lives, but had fallen for the possession of this hill. This hill, that was partly built on dead bodies already. A battle after which they lay rotting, fraternally united in death…. 
(Georges Blond – Verdun).

The Battle of Verdun is considered the greatest and lengthiest in world history. Never before or since has there been such a lengthy battle, involving so many men, situated on such a tiny piece of land. The main battle, which lasted from 21 February 1916 until 19 December 1916 caused over an estimated 700,000 casualties (dead, wounded and missing) on a battlefield was not even a square ten kilometres. From a strategic point of view there can be no justification for these atrocious losses. The battle degenerated into a matter of prestige of two nations…

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Verdunmap

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“Before Verdun, Friday evening, February 18, 1916

I say good-bye to you, my dear Parents and Brothers and Sisters. Thanks, most tender thanks for all that you have done for me. If I fall, I earnestly beg of you to bear it with fortitude. Reflect that I should probably never have achieved complete happiness and contentment….Farewell. You have known and are acquainted with all the others who have been dear to me and you will say good-bye to them for me. And so, in imagination, I extinguish the lamp of my existence on the eve of this terrible battle. I cut myself out of the circle of which I have formed a beloved part. The gap which I leave must be closed; the human chain must be unbroken. I, who once formed a small link in it, bless it for all eternity.

And till your last days, remember me, I beg you, with tender love. Honour my memory without gilding it, and cherish me in your loving, faithful hearts.” – Letters of German Students, London, Methuen, 1929

The “Musketier” you see in the first clip is Herr Peter Geyr. He was a native of the Eifel (Rhineland-Palatinate) and so he speaks the beautiful dialect my grandmother spoke. He was born in 1896, served in Infanterie-Regiment “Graf Werder” (4. Rheinisches) Nr. 30 and joined the German army as a volunteer in 1915. He passed away in 1984.

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ErnstWeckerlingThe following film shows Unteroffizier Ernst Weckerling. He is probably the most well known German World War 1 veteran as he made an appearance in the PBS documentary “People’s Century”. Weckerling volunteered on August 14, 1914 and was part of the German forces that, at terrible cost, sought to “bleed the French army white” at Verdun. In 1916 he was holding the rank of Unteroffizier in Füsilier-Regiment von Gersdorff (Kurhessisches) Nr.80. His story of the “Potatoe Helmet Spikes” is just brilliant. You will not find thing like that in the history books. 

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The next one was hard to transcribe. Herr Ernst Brecher was a Musketier in 3. Thüringisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr.71 which fought at Verdun as part of 38th Division from May to October 1916 before being moved to the Somme. 

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Herr Heinz Risse served as artillery observer in a Regiment of Field Artillery and tells us of his experiences in the fighting around the village of Fleury. He died on the 17th of July 1989 in Koblenz.

Johannes Kanth was born in 1896 and served as a Gefreiter in 1. Lothringisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr.130. 

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Musketier Heinrich Dorn, served in a German Infantry Regiment and was drafted in 1916. 

Egloff Freiherr von Freyberg-Eisenberg-Allmendingen was a former 3. Garde-Regiment zu Fuß officer originally commissioned on the 27th of January 1906. He was born in Allmendingen on the 3rd of October 1884 and died there a hundred years later on the 11th of February 1984!


He served with 3. G.R.z.F. for most of his early career before receiving flight training with Flieger-Abteilung 1 from 1st May 1912 onwards. He remained in the Reichsheer after the war retiring in 1930 as a Major. Reactivated on 1 Oct 1932 as an Oberstleutnant, he eventually rose to the rank of Generalmajor on 1st June 1938 before finally retiring on the 31st of October 1943. He spent his war service as the District Airfield Commandant at Kolberg.

Von Freyberg was a holder of the Royal Houseorder of Hohenzollern with Swords. Bavarian Military Merit Order 1.10.15

Württemberg Friedrich Order-Knight 1st Class 23.11.17
Mecklenburg-Schwerin Friedrich Franz Cross 2nd Class.
Iron Cross 1st and 2nd Class

He held a Prussian Crown Order 4th Class from before the war, and was a Knight of the Maltese Order.

He already had a flying licence in 1913 and was the flying instructor of Prinz Friedrich-Karl. In the short clip below he gives us his opinion on von Falkenhayn, whom he was personally accquainted with. One of the last “Eagles of the Prussian Army” 

 

Looks like Alec Guinness – Oberstleutnant Georg Adolf von Schneider-Egestorf 1834-1915

One of the few hobbies I have (excluding writing and research work) is to collect portraits of German soldiers and veterans of the wars of 1848, 1864, 1866 and 1870/71. The reason for this is probably that each photo allows me to do more research work. One of my favoured portraits is this one here (moved here from one of my obsolete blogs)

This awe-inspiring and dignified gentlemen is Oberstleutnant Georg Adolf von Schneider-Egestorf (Born in 1834 in Klötze/Saxony, died in Egestorf 1915).

The large cabinet photograph was taken on his 80th birthday on the 6th of January 1914. Before 1911 his name was Schneider only. In June of that year he was raised into the Prussian nobility by Kaiser Wilhelm II and was given the manor of Egestorf. From then on his name was “von Schneider-Egestorf”. His father had served with the Royal Hannovarian Army later rising to the rank of Oberst. His name was Friedrich Schneider (born 2nd of April 1797 and died in Einbeck in 1875). 

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Not only does he look a little bit like Sir Alec Guinness he is also wearing his Iron Cross 2nd Class which he earned in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/1871. On top of it you can see the oakleaves which were awarded to all holders of the Iron Cross of 1870 on the 25th anniversary of the war in 1895. The fact that he chose to wear his Iron Cross only shows the importance of the award to a 19th century soldier. 45,000 Iron Crosses 2nd Class were awarded for the period 1870/71 (in contrast to more than 5,000,000 in World War 1)

The Prussian Award lists for the year 1877 list 123 officers by the name of Schneider and we are lucky that only one of them has the christian name of Georg Adolf.

Number 32.377 in the list is Georg Adolf Schneider. In 1877 a Hauptmann in the7. Brandenburgisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 60.”.

This catalogue lists all german officers still alive at the date of print. We know that Georg Adolf was alive then and so we find him in the Prussian Rangliste (Officers lists) of 1870/1871 serving in the same regiment.

See the name of Schneider in the left column (Iron Cross 2nd Class)

He is also found in the Rangliste of 1881, now a Major and still serving in the 7th Brandenburg Infantry. He has now been awarded the Dienstauszeichnung für Offiziere (Meritous Service award for officers). In 1889 he seems to have been transfered to another unit. In this year the lists have him as Major in the “1. Thüringisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 31″By then he had also been awarded the Knights Cross 2nd Class of the Royal Hannovarian Order of Ernst-August (Ritterkreuz des königlich Hannoveranischen Ernst August Ordens 2. Klasse). Quite interesting as the Kingdom of Hannover didn’t even exist anymore but its King (living in Exile) continued to hand out awards.

So far I have not been able to trace him in any earlier lists, as his father was a Hanoverian officer, it might well be that Georg served in the Hanoverian aswell and only joined the Prussian Army after 1866. Still a bit of work to do here.

The Oberstleutnant a.D. with his impressive wife, 1914

Voices from Iron Times 1864-1871, Veterans’ Tales

Just an article I pulled over from one of my old and now obsolete blogs. 

ek1870A couple of days ago I bought an old book on a flea market close to where I live. Its title is “Unsere Veteranen” (Our Veterans) and was published by a chapter of the Reichskriegerbund (Reichs Warrior Association) in 1914. Most interestingly for me the chapter was a local one. The veterans that were members of it lived in my town and the towns and villages around it.

The book itself is special. Privately published by an association member it was meant to commemorate the 25thanniversary of the Kriegerbund and contains the tales of its members which fought in the wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870/71. According to the preface only 524 copies were printed, one for each veteran of these wars still alive in 1914.

It’s not in any library catalogue so I suppose the one I have here might easily be the only one remaining and it’s easy to tell why. It was very cheaply made. The binding has rotted away and the whole thing is falling to pieces.

What astounds me about these stories is their honesty. They lack a lot of the patriotic “With God for King and Fatherland” pathos which can be found in most period reports and writings. It’s clear that no one censored or proof read anything. The language is sometimes crude and the writing style is naive. The veterans wrote for their comrades. There was just no need to change anything. Facettes of the wars which you don’t find in the “popular” histories. Blood, Gore, cowardice, friendly fire, the harsh treatment of civilians, war against partisans.

HERMANN ANHUF  

Hermann Anhuf in 1914 wearing his 1870/71 campaign medal and the 1897 centenary medal.

Unit: 12. Kompanie, Infanterie-Regiment “Graf Barfuß” (4. Westfälisches) Nr. 17

Drawing by Carl Röchling - "Vor Metz" 1870

Drawing by Carl Röchling – “Vor Metz” 1870

1870/71 – War against France / Battles and Sieges: (20. Inf.-Div., X. Armeekorps) 16.8.1870: Vionville-Mars la Tour, 18.8.1870: Gravelotte-St.Privat, 19.8.-27.10.1870: Siege of Metz, 23.9.1870 La Maxe, 27.9.1870: Bellevue & Franclonchamp, 7.10.1870: Bellevue, 3. u. 4.12.1870: Orléans (II. Batallion), 11.12.1870: Swequeu Château u. Mortais (II. Batallion), 15.12.1870: Vendôme, 16.12.1870: Vendôme, Tuilleries & Courtiras (II. Batallion), 17.12.1870: Epuisay (I. Batallion), 20.12.1870: Monnaie (I. u. F.), 28.u.29.12.1870 Château Renault, 31.12.1870: Vendôme, 31.12.1870: Danzé (9th and 12th company only), 1.1.1871: Azay (I.), 4.1.1871: Courtiras (II. Batallion), 6.1.1871: Azay-Mazange (I.  and II. Batallion), 6.1.1871: Montoire-Les Roches, 9.1.1871: Chahaignes & Brives, 12.1.1871: Le Mans.

“When the war started I was serving with 12th coy of Infanterie-Regiment 17. We crossed the border into France in August as part of II. Armee, which was commanded by Prince Frederic Karl. On the 8th of August we left our luggage and backpacks behind to able to march faster, each man only keeping his 80 cartridges and the “Iron Ration”. The weather was hot but no one was allowed to drink! All wells were guarded by provosts as there were rumors that the french had poisoned them. On the 16th of August we marched towards the sound of the guns. On the 18th, near the village of St. Privat we were sent into action in support of the Guards. The enemy kept up a murderous fire and the Guards suffered severe losses, dead and maimed guardsmen lying everywhere. It was a ghastly sight.

I heard an officer calling “Forward now men of the 17th! On them! Charge!” and forward we charged towards the French. By then the whole village of St. Privat, including the church, was burning fiercely. Our Sergeant was hoping to get the Iron Cross and tried to lead our section into the attack on the left of the village where there was a huge open field, with no cover at all. When our Hauptmann noticed that he called out “Sergeant Albers, stop at once or I will have the men open fire on you!” So we rejoined the company very shortly afterwards.

On the 19th of August I noticed a small crowd of civilians and soldiers standing in a hollow close to our camp. I went to join them as I was curious about what was happening there. There were two women, about 30 years old and with their hands bound on their backs lying on the ground. Our lads were beating them with rifle butts. They were getting punished as they had been caught in the night after the battle when they were plundering some our wounded that were left lying on the field. One had even cut off the ring finger of a wounded soldier get his marriage ring. The other had mutilated the corpse of one of our officers. A while after the beating we shot them both.

On the 20th we marched through a ravine near Metz which was under siege. On the 27th we took part in the skirmish near La Maxe. During a rest near Les Grandes we were cleaning our rifles when our Hauptmann arrived and ordered us to reassemble them as the enemy was advancing on us. We were encamped in a large farmyard. Two platoons of our company were ordered to take defensive positions behind a wall while the third platoon took position outside the yard. Soon we could clearly see the french soldiers and opened fire. We fired until we had spent all of our ammunition, but luckily an ammunition cart arrived which enabled us to continue the fight. Our rifle barrels were red hot and it was getting hard to hold and aim the rifle at all. There were so many good targets that our Hauptmann ignored the order to leave the position and soon we began to get shelled by our own artillery. I can not put any blame on the gunners as they thought our position abandoned. The first shell missed us by about 50 meters. The next one went into some stables on our right. The third shell detonated right between the men of our platoon, killing two comrades and wounding another twelve.

After the fall of Metz I was ordered to escort a french prisoner, an artilleryman, to the POW camp. On the way there we encountered three stray sheep. I shoved the Frenchman into a ditch told him to bugger off home and herded the three sheep back to my company. The lads were more than happy. A good meat stew was far better than a single French prisoner!  After we had slaughtered the sheep we traded the beasts intestines against some good bottles of wine in a nearby village. Stew and wine made this night the most memorable of the campaign.”

Hermann Anhuf

Major Guido von Gillhaußen (1870-1918) – Soldier, Poet, Composer, Visionary

This article was inspired by and is dedicated to Herr Paul Reed (Twitter @sommecourt), who tweeted images of von Gillhaußens Tomb in Berlin a short while ago. I was intrigued what could be found about the man resting below it.

Gillhaussegrab

The tomb on the Invalidenfriedhof in Berlin (With Bundeswehr Honor Guard), after restoration in 2008

Guido Pankratius Hermann von Gillhaußen was born on the knightly estate of Esbach near Coburg (Thuringia) on the 12th of May 1870. His father was Benno von Gillhaußen (a former company commander in Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 13), his mother Helene von Gillhaußen, a born von Witzleben. Let me start with a basic military “curriculum vitae” up to WW1

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Gillhaußen in 1913

After visiting the “Educational Institue for Boys” in Taubold, the Grammar school at Ernestin and the Bensberg Cadet School he joined the army in October 1889.
01/10/1889 Fahnenjunker in Infanterie-Regiment Herwarth von Bittenfeld (1. Westfälisches) Nr. 13 in Münster
14/05/1890 Promotion to Fähnrich
18/01/1891 Promotion to Secondelieutenant
05/06/1900 Promotion to Premierlieutenant
14/09/1900 Inspecting officer in the War Academy in Potsdam
05/06 – 09/07/1901 Infantry shooting school
1902 Garde du Corps
07/04 – 01/07/1903 1. Garde Regiment zu Fuß (1st Regiment of Guards)
16/02/1904 Kaiser Franz Garde Grenadier Regiment Nr. 2
27/01/1905 Military tutor to Prince August Wilhelm of Prussia
01/04 – 13/06/1906 Supervising officer in the Garnisions-Lazarett II (military hospital) Berlin
14/06/1906 Promotion to Hauptmann and Company commander
18/05/1908 Commander of Fortress Küstrin
22/04/1914 Transfered to Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 3

Von Gillhaußen was not only an officer, he also spent a lot of time pursuing the arts. He liked to paint, found the time to study music at the private academy of Gottfried Adolf Stierlin in Münster (Westphalia) and wrote patriotic songs and poems.
Because of a chance meeting in the Harz Mountains on the 16th of July 1912, he is even became friends with Franz Kafka, who mentions Gillhaußen in his “Travel Diaries“.

"Clash of Swords" - Book containing Gillhaußens Poems and Songs, 1918

“Clash of Swords” – Book containing Gillhaußens Poems and Songs, 1918

Gillhaussen’s lasting fame was no result of his artistic works or military skills, it originates from a letter he sent to the Crown Prince of Prussia on the 3rd of August 1914, three days after the declaration of war.

Berlin S.O., 3rd of August 1914
Mariannenplatz 20
What I saw in the night of the 3rd of August 1914, written at 2am.
How will the war progress? It will not be over soon. It won’t be against one enemy only. Many enemies pass my vision and I see Belgium inflicting terrible wounds with boundless savagery. In the west I see France, beaten and raped by England, an England that will become our most significant enemy. I see us fighting in Africa, but it’s white people who try to annihilate us. Italy hurries to side with England, Russia and France. On the Balkans it’s Serbia and Romania. I try to struggle against Romania, but it stays. I can not believe it, but it stays. Russia causes trouble, but it will succumb even if aided by Japan. Just like England is aided by America. I see Roosevelt offering bread and wine to England’s King. He is clapping him on the back and presents the King with money, a powder horn, a dagger and lead bullets. Roosevelt seemed to be our friend!?!
The War will be terrible and will last for many years. More enemies appear in countries all over the world and they hurry to join the war on England’s side. All people of the Earth are swallowed by the war. I see war from North-America to Australia, from Serbia to Japan up to the Cape of Good Hope. England is everywhere. It is hiding in the governments of our enemies and rules brutally and egoistically. All bow to England, there is no exception. Is that possible? Germany is breaking, 1918 will be worst.
It seems the war will end in 1920, or is it a ceasefire only? It seems like it. How long will it last? Will the Kaiser live to see 1921?
I see the Kaiser, wearing his crown and ermine cape, sawing off the legs of his throne. His ermine cape looses color, it turns grey and slowly crumbles into dust. His crown shrinks, gets smaller up until the Kaiser himself melts away.
It seems to me as if England receives its death thrust in Egypt and India. Germany is terribly weakened and it will take 30 years until it recovers. Russia awakens and fights America for the possession of the future. God be with us!
Guido von Gillhaußen
Hauptmann, 6. Kompanie, 3. Garde-Grenadier-Regiment

The letter was sealed and handed over to Prince Frederic William of Prussia who opened it in autumn 1915 and then sent it back to Gillhaußen. After Gillhaußens death the letter was rediscovered by the executor of his last will and testament.
In May Gillhaußens elder brother (Oberst Curt von Gillhaußen) published it for the family. By indiscretion copies of the publication found their way to America where they were published in the late 1918.

Further military service

19/08/1914 Skirmishes at Héron (St. Donat)
23/08/1914 Skirmishes at St. Gerard
29/08/1914 Skirmishes at St. Quentin, Colonfay. Severly wounded by Shrapnel (Head and right shoulder), rifle bullet injures four fingers of the right hand.
30/08 to 03/09/1914  Hospital in Wiège
08/10/1914 Promotion to Major
04/09 to 10/12/1914 Further medical treatment in Aachen
11/12/1914 to 16/06/1915 Military Hospital in Wiesbaden
17/06-02/07/1915 Ambulatory treatment in Berlin
02/07/1915 Transfered back to the Front
03/07/1915 to 31/05/1916 Staff of the Gardekorps
01/06/1916 Commander of the Reserve Batallion of the 3. Garde-Grenadier-Regiment
10/06 to 20/06/1917 Excision of the tonsils, Charité in Berlin
21/06 to 03/07/1917 Ambulatory treatment by Geheimrat Prof. Dr. Kilian in Berlin (nervous debility)
04/07 to 15/08/1917 Health resort in Bad Kolberg (anaemia)
17/09 to 22/09/1917 Training course with Sturmbataillon of 1st Army
15/10 to 18/10/1917 Training course “Army Gas School”, Berlin
04/04/1918 Battalion commander (Fusilier-Batallion) of Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 5

Most of the above information has been collected by Major a.D. von Eberhardt (Association of Officers of the former 3rd Regiment of Guards).

Von Gillhaußen was not lucky. All together he only spent 33 days on the Western Front. In 1914 he had been wounded after only 19 days of service. In 1918 it took only 14 days.

“On the Morning of the 24th of April 1918, he (von Gillhaußen) was leading an attack near Villers-Brétonneux near Amiens. Leading from the Front and setting an example with his courage he was severly wounded at 1030 in the Morning. A large piece of shrapnel from a high explosive shell smashed his left thighbone, smaller pieces hit his right arm and heel. Even worse than that he was suffering from Gas poisoning (Gelbkreuz = Mustard Gas) and there was the danger that the gas had entered his wounds” (1)

After being wounded, 1915

After being wounded, 1914

Another account reads:

“In a stretch of English made trench we find our new Major von Gillhaußen and with him the the other staff officers of the Fusilier-Battalion. At noon we get attacked by English infantry and 8 tanks from the direction of the village of Cachy. Our Major jumps out of the trench, spreads out his arms and bellows “Follow me! 9th company needs our support”. He leads and we follow him. On his breast and round his neck I can see his gleaming medals. Shortly afterwards he goes down, fatally wounded. With him we not only lost a famous Poet, whose song “Wir nahen in Demut. Gott Dir, Du Allmächtiger” (To you we walk humbly, almighty God) our recruits sang after taking their oath, we also lost a real man and a true Prussian guards officer. We loved him for his fairness and his austerity. He loved his fatherland and paid the ultimate price for his love. Loyal unto death, just as it reads in one of his poems. Umbrüllt und dereinstens der Donner der Schlachten und dräuet uns grimmig auch Schrecken und Not: Wir halten den Treueschwur, wills tagen, wills nachten! Ob Sieg oder Sterben: Treu bis zum Tod! (When the Thunder of Battle comes screaming and horror and need awaits us, we will be loyal. In day and at night, in victory and dying. Loyal unto Death! ) (2)”

Telegram reporting Gillhaußens death

Telegram reporting Gillhaußens death

According to von Eberhardt, Gillhaußen was transported to Feldlazarett 16 and from there (on the 28th of April) into the military hospital (Luisenhospital) in Aachen. The mustard gas had indeed infected his wounds, so his left leg had to be amputated. All further treatments were to no avail. Gillhaußen died on the 2nd of May 1918 at 0800 in the morning. His body was brought to Berlin and was buried on the “Invalidenfriedhof“. The highly decorative gravestone survived World War 2 and the construction of the Berlin Wall and was restored by the association “friends of the Invalidenfriedhof” in 2008.
As Gillhaußen was a Knight of the Order of St. John his name is also remembered in the stained windows of the Church of the Holy Mother in Slonsk (Poland), a former Church of the Order of St. John (Window 1, behind the altar).
Gillhaußens medals included:

Iron Cross 2nd and 1st Class, Prussian Order of the Red Eagle 4th Class, Prussian Order of the Crown 4th Class, Saxon-Ernestinian House Order (Knights Cross, 1st Class with Swords), Hessian Order of Philip the Magnanimous (Knights Cross 2nd Class), Saxon Arts and Science Medal in Silver, Austrian Order of Franz-Joseph, Romanian Order of the Star, Prussian Order of St. John (Knights Cross), Lippe War Merit Cross for Combatants.

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Sidenotes:

Hauptmann Leo von Gillhaußen (Guidos youngest brother), was killed on the 6th of November 1918 south-west of La Croix-Hautrage by shellfire. He is buried at Hautrage near Mons.

Oberst Curt von Gillhaußen (Guidos elder brother), served as adjutant to His Royal Highness Edward, Duke of Sachse-Coburg and Gotha, survived the war and passed away in 1956.

Guido von Gillhaußen and his brothers

Guido von Gillhaußen, his brothers and their wives

Sources and further reading:

1. Major a. D. von Eberhardt (Schriftleiter der „Mitteilungen des Vereins der Offiziere des ehemaligen 3. Garde Regiments zu Fuß e.V.“) Archiv 3. Garde Regiment z. F.

2. War Diary of Fritz Robert Buschmann,
Mettmann, vom Garde Grenadierregiment  Nr. 5.: Der Heldentod des Majors v. Gillhaußen vom Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 3, in: Das Ehrenbuch der Garde, Die preußische Garde im Weltkriege 1914–1919

Albrecht von Stosch, Oberstleutnant a.D.: Das Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 5 1897 – 1918. Nach amtlichen Kriegtagebüchern und Mitteilungen von Mitkämpfern bearbeitet (1922)

also used various editions of the Rangliste der königlich preussischen Armee

Post scriptum

Should you ever be able to visit Berlin, make sure you take some time to visit the beautiful memorial of the 5th Guard Grenadier Regiment in the Stabholz Garden in Spandau. When war broke out in 1914, the officers and soldiers of the Regiment vowed that they would erect an appropriate monument for the brothers in arms that would be killed in the battles to come.

ggd1 ggd2 ggd3
In May 1922 the monument was unveiled. The bronze statue is called “Die Wacht” (The Guard) and was designed by August Schreitmüller (1871-1958). It shows a soldier armed with a short sword, wearing only a steel helmet and a loincloth and an eagle sitting at his feet. The memorial is dedicated to the 4122 casualties the Regiment suffered during the Great War.

The inscription reads: Seinen im Weltkriege / gefallenen Kameraden / Das Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 5 (To the comrades killed in the Great War)

Gottmituns.net now with own proofreading service. Thanks to the charming Dawn Monks (@DawnMonks) for ironing out inconsistencies and errors. (Follow her on Twitter)

 

Kolomyja 1941, Bearing Witness

For the dead and the living, we must bear witness.”
― Elie Wiesel

When I look through the photographs of old soldiers of the German Army, I sometimes stumble over images like the ones shown below.

You might overlook them, when not actually searching for them and surprisingly this is just what  happened here, as this album has been in my possession for ages. The small series of photographs was taken by a soldier of an unidentified Wehrmacht artillery unit shortly after entering the town of  Kolomyja (West Ukraine).

More info on Kolomyja and Kolomyja Ghetto can be found HERE.

I had a long think what to write here, but words fail me. The Shoah fills me with shame, and I pray for the victims and the survivors. 

I will let the images speak for themselves and I have refrained from marking these images with the usual “gottmituns” tag…

kolo1

Outskirts of Kolomyja

kolo2

Kolomyja

kolo3

Local population

kolo4

Soldiers of the Wehrmacht searching Jews

kolo5

Defiance in his eyes – a powerful photograph

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Waffen-SS soldiers force Jewish men to cut off their Payot (Sidelocks)

kolo7

 

Military Book review – Rückzug: The German Retreat from France, 1944 by Joachim Ludewig

Joachim Ludewig, Rückzug: The German Retreat from France, 1944.

“Rückzug is an important book. It is the first serious study to focus on the six-week period from the Operation Dragoon landings on the Mediterranean coast in mid-August and the partial Allied victory at the Falaise pocket…. A professional and well-researched assessment of this surprisingly under-examined phase of World War II.” — Anthony Beevor, Wall Street Journal

Adobe Photoshop PDF

Click will lead you to the Amazon product page

The Allied invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, marked a critical turning point in the European theatre of World War II. The massive landing on France’s coast had been meticulously planned for three years, and the Allies anticipated a quick and decisive defeat of the German forces. Many of the planners were surprised, however, by the length of time it ultimately took to defeat the Germans.
While much has been written about D-day, very little has been written about the crucial period from August to September, immediately after the invasion. In Rückzug, Joachim Ludewig draws on military records from both sides to show that a quick defeat of the Germans was hindered by excessive caution and a lack of strategic boldness on the part of the Allies, as well as by the Germans’ tactical skill and energy. This intriguing study, translated from German, not only examines a significant and often overlooked phase of the war, but also offers a valuable account of the conflict from the perspective of the German forces.

Between June 6 and the first week of September 1944, the western Allies bludgeoned the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS units tasked by Adolf Hitler to defend northwestern Europe.

The consequences of this battering were grievous for the fighting men of both sides. Yet because the Allies possessed not only brave, well trained, and aggressive soldiers, but also absolute control of the airspace above the battlefields and a very substantial preponderance of weapons and motorized vehicles, the German units engaged in the fighting suffered far greater losses, both literally and proportionally, than their Allied counterparts.

And when the Allied forces neutralized the German coastal defenses and emerged into the French countryside in early August, the Germans could muster but little in the way of a cohesive defensive front.

As the Germans drew nearer to their homeland, however, they managed to patch together a more formidable defensive line to temporarily blunt the Allied assault. The result was eight more months of warfare in western Europe, and the loss of many more thousands of human lives.

How did this turn of events come to pass?

That is the question asked and answered in Joachim Ludewig’s Rückzug: The German Retreat from France, 1944. The University Press of Kentucky has done a great service to those with a serious interest in the Second World War by publishing Ludewig’s work in English. The book is scrupulously researched, not only in the pertinent German military records, but also in the manifold sources that tell the official side of the Allied story. The result is an excellent historical study of a course of events in need of explication.

Author Ludewig identifies a dozen factors that enhanced the ability of the German armed forces to cobble together an effective defense in the autumn of 1944.

The original German edition was first published by the MGFA (Military History Research Institute of the German Armed Forces) in 1994 and it was about time that this valuable work was translated into English. As all publication of the MGFA I can heartily recommend it. Be warned that is not a “popular” history book and no “easy reading”. Everyone not scared off by this, will find the most detailed and comprehensive account of the Wehrmacht’s retreat from France published so far. 

Highly recommended. 

The author, Joachim Ludewig is an officer in the German Army Reserve. He currently serves as a civil servant in the German Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection. He lives in Bonn, Germany.

Colorized! – Feldwebel Heinrich Gilgenbach, KIA 10th of March 1942

Heinrich Gilgenbach, my Grandmothers eldest brother (born in November 1913), was a professional soldier who had joined the army as a volunteer in 1936, after having learned the traditional family trade of a mason.  I am still working on details pertaining to his death in March 1942, so I will only publish some basic information here.

Heinrich Gilgenbach - another fantastic recolored photograph done by Mr. Nick Stone

Heinrich Gilgenbach – another fantastic recolored photograph done by Mr. Nick Stone

When war broke out in 1939, Heinrich was serving in the rank of an Unteroffizier in Reserve Pionier-Battalion 34, acting as instructor to future pioneers. He saw a very short-term of active service in 1940, having been transferred to a bridgelayer company of Pionier-Battalion 179, he took part in building provisional bridges near Moncel and Chatel (17th and 21st of June). When the unit became part of the occupational contingent in France Heinrich was transferred back to germany, where he once again returned to his old job of training pioneer recruits.
Heinrich was not well liked. Neither within the village where he was born in (he was said to be a womanizer), nor in the army unit he served in. He was a through professional, he was strict, tough and unforgiving to the recruits. From what my grandmother and some of the old people of his home village told me he seemed to have a big problem with the fact that he had only seen so little actual fighting. He wanted to be at the front, a wish that was constantly getting denied by his superiors.
In January 1942, Heinrichs dream became true when he received the order to join Pionier-Battalion 291, serving as part of the elite 291. Infanterie-Division (also known as “Elch-Division“, Elch=Moose) which was operating with Army Group North in the vicinity of Leningrad in the Battle of the Volkhov Pocket.  There he was to take command of a platoon, so shortly after arriving at the front he was promoted to the rank of Feldwebel.

On the 10th of March 1942, Heinrichs platoon, operating as common line infantry, was ordered to clear a part of the dense birch forests around Krasnaya-Gorka from one of many small pockets of soviet stragglers which were keeping up resistance, ambushing german patrols and supply trucks and raiding german dressing stations,  after their parent units had been destroyed.

It was during this operation that Heinrich was hit by the fatal bullet. According to the letter sent to his wife he stayed alive long enough to tell his comrades how much he loved to be a soldier and to mutter his farewell wishes to his wife and daughter (the usual text found inside these death messages). He was buried on the Divisional graveyard at Glubotschka.

After WW2 the graveyard was lost. In 2011 it was relocated and a team of German and Russian soldiers working for the German War Graves commission exhumed the bodies. Sadly the cemetery had already been plundered by Russian grave robbers. Only 7 ID tags were found. Heinrichs remains could not be identified.

Thanks again to Nick Stone (@typejunky) for the great work.

Below some photographs taken by Georg Gundlach (291. Divisions Chronicler, died in 2010) during the Volkhov Battles in 1942.

291Arse2VolchovPocket1942-041 291Arse2VolchovPocket1942-042 291ArseVolchovPocket1942-039 291CapturedSiberiansoldiersVolchovPocket1942-146 291deadVolchovPocket1942-159 291DressingIII506VolchovPocket1942-139 291ErikaVolchovPocket1942-113 291ErikaVolchovPocket1942-128 291ErikaVolchovPocket1942-152 291VolchovPocket1942-013 291VolchovPocket1942-020 291VolchovPocket1942-021 291VolchovPocket1942-022 291VolchovPocket1942-024 291VolchovPocket1942-049 291VolchovPocket1942-050 291VolchovPocket1942-051 291VolchovPocket1942-054 291VolchovPocket1942-055 291VolchovPocket1942-056 291VolchovPocket1942-077 291VolchovPocket1942-078 291VolchovPocket1942-079 291VolchovPocket1942-102 291VolchovPocket1942-105 291VolchovPocket1942-107 291VolchovPocket1942-109 291VolchovPocket1942-122 291VolchovPocket1942-142 291VolchovPocket1942-148 291VolchovPocket1942-269 291VolchovPocket1942-271 291VolchovPocket1942-286 291Volchow1942VolchovPocket1942-0129 291WeyelVolchovPocket1942-086

Iron Cross 2nd Class – Award citations 1941-1943, SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 4 „Der Führer“

ekblgWhen I visit boot fairs or have a look through Ebay I am always struck by the sheer number of Iron Crosses sold there. The Iron Cross 2nd Class was one of the most common bravery awards of both WW1 and WW2, with more than 8 Million awarded during both World Wars. They sell cheap, a good WW1 cross for around 40 Euros, its WW2 successor fetching a bit more. I know collectors who have piles of them carelessly stacked into boxes.  What did it take to get this basic level of the Iron Cross? Even with the original award document being present the history behind the award stays a mystery. Citations are hard to find, but by accident I stumbled over a series of original citations filed inside the War Diaries of SS Panzergrenadier-Regiment 4 “Der Führer”.

I know that Iron Crosses were not awarded for just “being there”, but even I was surprised to read what it took to get one of these basic awards. 

I have translated some of the citations which you will find below. 

SS-Panzergrenadiers in Russia, 1941 (Bundesarchiv)

SS-Panzergrenadiers in Russia, 1941 (Bundesarchiv)

Kühbacher

“SS-Rottenführer Kübacher, who already participated in the Campaign in the West has demonstrated his bravery on the 11th of November 1941 during an attack on fortified enemy positions in the forests north of Staraya. Being wounded himself he forced his way into an enemy position and killed its two men crew.

schaefer

SS-Sturmmann Schäfer has distinguished himself on the 11th of November 1941, during an attack on enemy fortified positions in the forests north of Staraya, when he rescued and returned a severely wounded comrade ignoring heavy enemy machine-gun and sniper fire while doing so. Thus a timely treatment of the wounded soldier was possible.”

conrads

“The SS-Panzergrenadier Gerhard Conrads has distinguished himself during house to house fighting in Bereka by carrying ammunition forward during a most critical situation. He has also shown bravery and recklessness in close combat.

Kohs

“On the 4th of February 1943, SS-Hauptscharführer Kohs led his reinforced platoon in a reconnaissance patrol towards the villages of Sacharowka-Iwanovka. With his spirit and cautiousness he has not only obtained vital reconnaissance results but also inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.  On the evening of the following day, during another recon patrol, some vehicles of his platoon bogged down. In spite of Russian attacks coming from three sides and lasting for hours Kohls not only managed to repel the attackers, but also managed to extract all of the Platoons vehicles.  When on the way back the main road was blocked by strong Russian forces, Kohs forced a breakthrough, killing an enemy AT gun crew by doing so.  With his spirited behaviour Kohs has not only saved valuable vehicles, he has also inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. The company asks to decorate SS-Hauptscharführer Kohs with the Iron Cross 2nd Class.”

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More citations when I find the time.